Here at the Representation project, we’re compiling a bibliography on the relation between binary belief and credence. We welcome your recommendations for additions and amendments in the comments!
Belief as credence one
Roger Clarke (2013). Belief is Credence One (in Context). Philosophers’ Imprint 13 (11): 1–18.
Daniel Greco (2013). Possibility and Prodigality. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 4.
Belief as credence above a threshold
Richard Foley (2009). Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Scott Sturgeon (2008). Reason and the Grain of Belief. Noûs 42 (1), 139–165.
puzzles about reducing belief to credence
Henry E. Kyburg Jr. (1970). Conjunctivitis. In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Hannes Leitgeb (2013). The Review Paradox: On The Diachronic Costs of Not Closing Rational Belief Under Conjunction. Noûs 47 (3).
Hanti Lin & Kevin T. Kelly (2012). A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic. Synthèse 186 (2): 531–575.
A pragmatic role for belief
Mark Kaplan (1996). Decision Theory as Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brian Weatherson (2005). Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment? Philosophical Perspectives 19, 417–43.
Brian Weatherson (manuscript). Games, Beliefs and Credences.
Ralph Wedgwood (2012). Outright Belief. Dialectica 66 (3): 309–329.
Other forms of Pluralism
Lara Buchak (forthcoming). Belief, Credence, and Norms. Philosophical Studies: 1–27.
Keith Frankish (2009). Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Jane Friedman (2013). Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 4.
Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Jonathan Weisberg (manuscript). Belief: Partial & Full (slides).
Eliminativism about belief
Richard Jeffrey (1970). Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief. In M. Swain, ed., Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, Dordrecht: Reidel, 157–85.
Patrick Maher (1993). Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eliminativism about credence
Gilbert Harman (1986). Change in View. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press
Richard Holton (forthcoming). Intention as a Model for Belief. In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press.