Here at the Representation project, we’re compiling a bibliography on the relation between binary belief and credence. We welcome your recommendations for additions and amendments in the comments!
Reductivism
Belief as credence one
Roger Clarke (2013). Belief is Credence One (in Context). Philosophers’ Imprint 13 (11): 1–18.
Daniel Greco (2013). Possibility and Prodigality. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 4.
Belief as credence above a threshold
Richard Foley (2009). Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Scott Sturgeon (2008). Reason and the Grain of Belief. Noûs 42 (1), 139–165.
puzzles about reducing belief to credence
Henry E. Kyburg Jr. (1970). Conjunctivitis. In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Hannes Leitgeb (2013). The Review Paradox: On The Diachronic Costs of Not Closing Rational Belief Under Conjunction. Noûs 47 (3).
Hanti Lin & Kevin T. Kelly (2012). A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic. Synthèse 186 (2): 531–575.
Pluralism
A pragmatic role for belief
Mark Kaplan (1996). Decision Theory as Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brian Weatherson (2005). Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment? Philosophical Perspectives 19, 417–43.
Brian Weatherson (manuscript). Games, Beliefs and Credences.
Ralph Wedgwood (2012). Outright Belief. Dialectica 66 (3): 309–329.
Other forms of Pluralism
Lara Buchak (forthcoming). Belief, Credence, and Norms. Philosophical Studies: 1–27.
Keith Frankish (2009). Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
Jane Friedman (2013). Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 4.
Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Jonathan Weisberg (manuscript). Belief: Partial & Full (slides).
Eliminativism
Eliminativism about belief
Richard Jeffrey (1970). Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief. In M. Swain, ed., Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, Dordrecht: Reidel, 157–85.
Patrick Maher (1993). Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eliminativism about credence
Gilbert Harman (1986). Change in View. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press
Richard Holton (forthcoming). Intention as a Model for Belief. In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press.
Foundations of Thought 
For the ‘pragmatic role’ section:
Dorit Ganson, ‘Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief’, Philosophical Studies, 139, 2008.
I liked a lot
David Christensen (2004), Putting Logic in Its Place, Oxford University Press.
I think it should go in “Belief as credence above a threshold”, though it could also fit in “Other forms of pluralism”. What the book argues is that the rational contraints on (all-or-nothing) belief derive entirely from rational contraints on credence.
A few suggested additions to “puzzles about reducing belief to credence” (apologies for the shameless plug to my own work!):
Chandler, J. (2010). The Lottery Paradox Generalised? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61(3): 667–679.
Chandler, J. (2013). Probability, Acceptance and Aggregation. Erkenntnis 78(1): 201-217.
Douven, I. and Williamson, T. (2006). Generalizing the Lottery Paradox. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57(4):755–779.
Levi, I. (1996). For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Non-monotonic Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Smith, M. (2010). A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 61(4):821–831.
All the best,
Jake
For another belief-as-credence-above-a-threshold view, see: Hawthorne, J. (2009). The Lockean thesis and the logic of belief. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Perti (Ed.), Degrees of belief (pp. 49-74). New York: Springer.