Bibliography on Propositions

Over the next few weeks, we’ll be doing some reading on propositions. Our focus is on the work that propositions might do in an account of the nature of representation and intentionality, and on problems with the traditional views and alternatives to these views. Suggestions welcome!


Unity of the proposition:

King (2009) ‘Questions of Unity’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 109, Issue 1 pt 3, pp 257-277

King (2013) ‘Propositional Unity: What’s the problem, Who Has It and Who Solves It?’ Philosophical Studies, Volume 165, Issue 1pp 71-9

Soames (2010) ‘Frege and Russell: The Real Problem of “the Unity of the Proposition”’, What is Meaning?. New Jersey: Princeton University Press

 Substitution puzzles & designating propositions:

Friederike Moltmann (2003) ‘Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions’ Synthese 135, 77-118

Jeff King (2007) ‘Designating Propositions’, The Philosophical Review, 111 (3), 341-71

Against the Traditional Views:

Soames (2013) ‘For Want of Cognitively Defined Propositions: A History of Insights and Missed Philosophical Opportunities’ in Act Based Conceptions of Propositional Content: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Eds. Arapinis, Moltmann & Textor

Soames (2014) ‘Why the Traditional Conceptions of Propositions can’t be Correct’ in New Thinking about Propositions, by King, Soames & Speaks. Oxford: OUP

 Propositions as representational, but not intrinsically so

Propositions as Cognitive Types:

Soames (2012) What is Meaning?.  New Jersey: Princeton University Press

Soames (2014) ‘Propositions as Cognitive Event Types’ in New Thinking about Propositions Oxford: OUP

Peter Hanks (2011) “Structured Propositions as Types”, Mind, 120: 11–52.

Propositions as Facts:

Jeff King (2007) The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford: OUP

Propositions as non-representational entities

Jeff Speaks (2014) ‘Propositions are Properties of Everything or Nothing’ in New Thinking about Propositions, by King, Soames & Speaks. Oxford: OUP

Instrumentalism/Measurement Theoretic Accounts

Donald Davidson (1991) ‘What is Present to the Mind’ Philosophical Issues, 1.

Stalnaker (1984) ‘The Problem of Intentionality’, Inquiry. Cambridge: MIT Press

Robert Matthews (1994) ‘The Measure of Mind’, Mind 103: 131-146

Robert Matthews (2007) The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution Oxford: OUP

Robert Matthews (2011) ‘Measurement-Theoretic Accounts of the Propositional Attitudes’, Philosophy Compass, 831


One response to “Bibliography on Propositions

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