Recent Visitors

In 2013-2014, we had several visitors to the representation project:

November 2013: Damian Rochford (MIT), “The Calibration Theory of Learning”

January 2014: Gurpreet Rattan (Toronto), “Disagreement and Conceptual Understanding”

February 2014: Richard Holton (Cambridge), “Intention as a model for belief”.

March 2014: Wolfgang Schwarz (ANU) (three talks), “Imaginary Foundations”, “Subjunctive Conditional Probability”, and “Decision Theory in Ethics”

May 2014: Zoe Drayson (Stirling) (three talks), “Redundant representations and intentional explanation”, “Action-oriented perception”, and “Representation and reflexive thought”

June 2014: Mahrad Almotahari (UIC), “‘Good’ without Good”

Upcoming visiting speakers

Gurpreet Rattan (University of Toronto) will be giving a talk on 27 January at Leeds for the Nature of Representation project.

Next semester, we also have lined up Wolfgang Schwarz and Zoe Drayson to participate in the project.  In the following academic year, our upcoming speakers include Elizabeth Camp, Richard Heck, and Hartry Field.

Bibliography on Propositions

Over the next few weeks, we’ll be doing some reading on propositions. Our focus is on the work that propositions might do in an account of the nature of representation and intentionality, and on problems with the traditional views and alternatives to these views. Suggestions welcome!

Problems

Unity of the proposition:

King (2009) ‘Questions of Unity’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 109, Issue 1 pt 3, pp 257-277

King (2013) ‘Propositional Unity: What’s the problem, Who Has It and Who Solves It?’ Philosophical Studies, Volume 165, Issue 1pp 71-9

Soames (2010) ‘Frege and Russell: The Real Problem of “the Unity of the Proposition”’, What is Meaning?. New Jersey: Princeton University Press

 Substitution puzzles & designating propositions:

Friederike Moltmann (2003) ‘Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions’ Synthese 135, 77-118

Jeff King (2007) ‘Designating Propositions’, The Philosophical Review, 111 (3), 341-71

Against the Traditional Views:

Soames (2013) ‘For Want of Cognitively Defined Propositions: A History of Insights and Missed Philosophical Opportunities’ in Act Based Conceptions of Propositional Content: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Eds. Arapinis, Moltmann & Textor

Soames (2014) ‘Why the Traditional Conceptions of Propositions can’t be Correct’ in New Thinking about Propositions, by King, Soames & Speaks. Oxford: OUP

 Propositions as representational, but not intrinsically so

Propositions as Cognitive Types:

Soames (2012) What is Meaning?.  New Jersey: Princeton University Press

Soames (2014) ‘Propositions as Cognitive Event Types’ in New Thinking about Propositions Oxford: OUP

Peter Hanks (2011) “Structured Propositions as Types”, Mind, 120: 11–52.

Propositions as Facts:

Jeff King (2007) The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford: OUP

Propositions as non-representational entities

Jeff Speaks (2014) ‘Propositions are Properties of Everything or Nothing’ in New Thinking about Propositions, by King, Soames & Speaks. Oxford: OUP

Instrumentalism/Measurement Theoretic Accounts

Donald Davidson (1991) ‘What is Present to the Mind’ Philosophical Issues, 1.

Stalnaker (1984) ‘The Problem of Intentionality’, Inquiry. Cambridge: MIT Press

Robert Matthews (1994) ‘The Measure of Mind’, Mind 103: 131-146

Robert Matthews (2007) The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution Oxford: OUP

Robert Matthews (2011) ‘Measurement-Theoretic Accounts of the Propositional Attitudes’, Philosophy Compass, 831

Bibliography on Belief and Degrees of Belief

Here at the Representation project, we’re compiling a bibliography on the relation between binary belief and credence.  We welcome your recommendations for additions and amendments in the comments!


Reductivism

Belief as credence one

Roger Clarke (2013). Belief is Credence One (in Context). Philosophers’ Imprint 13 (11): 1–18.

Daniel Greco (2013). Possibility and Prodigality. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 4.

Belief as credence above a threshold

Richard Foley (2009). Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.

Scott Sturgeon (2008). Reason and the Grain of Belief. Noûs 42 (1), 139–165.

puzzles about reducing belief to credence

Henry E. Kyburg Jr. (1970). Conjunctivitis. In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Hannes Leitgeb (2013). The Review Paradox: On The Diachronic Costs of Not Closing Rational Belief Under Conjunction. Noûs 47 (3).

Hanti Lin & Kevin T. Kelly (2012). A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic. Synthèse 186 (2): 531–575.

Pluralism

A pragmatic role for belief

Mark Kaplan (1996). Decision Theory as Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brian Weatherson (2005). Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment? Philosophical Perspectives 19, 417–43.

Brian Weatherson (manuscript). Games, Beliefs and Credences.

Ralph Wedgwood (2012). Outright BeliefDialectica 66 (3): 309–329.

Other forms of Pluralism

Lara Buchak (forthcoming). Belief, Credence, and Norms. Philosophical Studies: 1–27.

Keith Frankish (2009). Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.

Jane Friedman (2013). Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, vol. 4.

Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Jonathan Weisberg (manuscript). Belief: Partial & Full (slides).

Eliminativism

Eliminativism about belief

Richard Jeffrey (1970). Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief. In M. Swain, ed., Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, Dordrecht: Reidel, 157–85.

Patrick Maher (1993). Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eliminativism about credence

Gilbert Harman (1986). Change in View. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press

Richard Holton (forthcoming). Intention as a Model for Belief. In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press.

Conditional thinking, January 14/15 2014

The Nature of Representation project will be sponsoring a workshop on Conditional Thought, scheduled to take place on the 14/15 January 2014 at the University of Leeds.

Speakers will include:

  • Arif Ahmed (Cambridge)
  • Richard Bradley (LSE)
  • Dorothy Edgington (Birkbeck)
  • Daniel Elstein/Robert Williams (Leeds).

Contact j.r.g.williams@leeds.ac.uk for inquiries.

Dummett Symposium, September 4-5 2013.

The ERC nature of representation project will be co-sponsoring a symposium on the philosophical and logical work of Michael Dummett. This will take place on September 4-5 2013. Details can be found here:

http://www.personal.leeds.ac.uk/~matmlc/BLC/

Wednesday 4 September 2013

12:00 -12:45 Registration

12:45 -13:00 Douglas Bridges
13:00 -13:15 Daniel Isaacson
13:15 -14:25 Crispin Wright “Frege’s Colossal Blunder”
14:35 -15:45 Per Martin-Löf “Truth of Empirical Propositions”
15:45 -16:15 Coffee & Tea
16:15 -17:25 Imogen Dickie “t.b.a.”
17:35 -18:45 Michael Rathjen “On Existence Properties”

19:30 Conference Dinner

Thursday 5 September 2013

09:20-10:30 Philip Welch “Conceptual Realism: Sets, Classes and Reflection”
10:30-11:00 Coffee & Tea
11:00-12:10 Ian Rumfitt “Truth and meaning”
12:15 Lunch Buffet

Imogen Dickie visits the project, 28 January-1st Feb

Imogen Dickie (Toronto) is the first Representation project visitor. She’ll be in Leeds for a week at the end of January. During this time, we’ll be discussing her new book, and on the Friday she’ll be giving a seminar.