Publications supported by the NatRep project:
Williams:
Monograph: The Metaphysics of Representation. OUP 2019.
Draft monograph (the link is to an early version–the published version has reworked and new chapters): The Nature of Representation.
“Commitment problems in the naive theory of belief” forthcoming in Unstructured Content, Kindermann, van Elswyk, and Egan (eds), OUP.
“Words by convention” (with Gail Leckie) Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Language (2019)
“Normative Reference Magnets” Philosophical Review, 2018.
“Rational illogicality“. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2017
“Indeterminate Oughts“. Ethics, 127. pp. 645-673, 2017, 2017.
“Representational Scepticism: The Bubble Puzzle” Philosophical Perspectives Volume 30, Issue 1, 2016.
“Angst, indeterminacy and conflicting values.” in Ratio Volume 29, Issue 4 December 2016
“Vagueness as indecision” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 2016.
“Lewis on reference and eligibility” in Companion to David Lewis, Loewer and Schaffer, eds, 2015.
Carr:
“Deontic modals” chapter in forthcoming Routledge Handbook of Metaethics.
“Subjective ‘Ought'” Ergo 2015
“Epistemic expansions” Res Philosophica 2015
“Ecumenical Expressivism Ecumenicized: comments on Ridge’s Impassioned Belief” Analysis Reviews 2015
“Don’t Stop Believing”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2015.
“The ‘If P, ought P’ problem” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2014.
Goodman:
Mental Files and Singular Thought, edited volume forthcoming with OUP.
‘Do Acquaintance Theorists Have an Attitude Problem?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2017.
‘On the Supposed Connection Between Proper Names and Singular Thought’ Synthese, 2016.
“Cognitivism, Significance and Singular Thought”, The Philosophical Quarterly 66:263, 2016.
“Against the mental files conception of singular thought” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2014.
Elliott:
“Probabilism, Representation Theorems, and Whether Deliberation Crowds out Prediction”, Erkenntnis, 2016.
‘A representation theorem for frequently irrational agents’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2016.
Crosilla:
“Predicativity and Feferman”, forthcoming in G. Jӓger and W. Sieg (eds.), Feferman and Foundations, Springer’s book series “Outstanding Contributions to Logic”
Gamester:
“Truth: explanation, success, and coincidence” forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
Hewitt:
“A note on Uzquiano’s ‘Varieties of Indefinite Extensibility'” forthcoming in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 59(3). 455-459. 2018.
“If an ontologist could speak, we couldn’t understand him”. Inquiry 61(4). 444-458. 2018.
“Tuples all the way down?”. Thought 7(3). 161-9. 2018.
Talks by project members:
Williams:
St Andrews, keynote at Arche Graduate Conference. October 2017. “”Linguistic convention and the metaphysics of mental representation”
LSE, conference on philosophy of language for decision theory, May 2017. “Options!”
Toronto, departmental seminar, April 2017 “Induction and Interpretation”
UCL, departmental seminar, November 2016. “Normative Reference Magnets”
Cambridge, moral sciences club, Spring 2016. “Normative Reference Magnets”
Leeds, Sense and Metasemantics. “The Grain and Ground of Doxastic Space”.
Rutgers, Unstructured Conference. April 2016. “The Grain and Ground of Doxastic Space”
Michigan, visitor attached to Sarah Moss’s seminar, November 2015.
Bergen, conference on logic, October 2015. “Rational Illogicality”
Hamburg, conference on Lewis on representation, September 2015. “State based and stage based interpretationism”.
ANU ethical uncertainty conference. Paper became “Indeterminate oughts”.
ANU, philsoc, July 2015. “Representations of an external world”
Oxford, conference on the philosophical significance of verbal disputes, May 2015 “Real representation”
Ratio conference on indeterminacy and ethics, April 2015 “Indeterminacy, Angst and Ethics”.
Leeds NatRep workshop on Radical Interpretation: “The grain and ground of doxastic space”
Stockholm, November 2014. “Representations of an external world”
Uppsala, November 2014. “Rational illogicality”
York, Mind Network Meeting, October 4th 2014. “Representations of an external world”.
Kings College London, departmental colloquium, September 2014. “Representations of an external world”
Munich, conference on Logical Norms. September 2014. “Rational illogicality”
Leeds, inaugural lecture “Representations of an external world”.
Duke University, workshop on Belief. May 2014. (Comments on Fitelson’s work on accuracy and partial belief).
Hamburg, conference on Conditionals. April 2014. “Decisions, suppositions and conditionals” (drawing on joint work with Daniel Elstein).
Leeds centre for ethics and metaethics, March 2014. “Indeterminacy and choice”.
Leeds undergraduate philosophy society, February 2014. “Frege”
Leeds Centre for metaphysics and mind, January 2014 “Rational illogicality”.
Leeds Representation seminar, “Radical Interpretation Revisited” (three seminars).
Leeds, NatRep workshop on conditional thinking. “Suppositions and Decisions” (joint work with Daniel Elstein).
Cambridge, Trinity Undergraduate Philosophy Society, January 2014. “Semantic bookkeeping and semantic teleology”
Reading, departmental colloquium, January 2014. “Rational illogicality”
Princeton, departmental colloquium, November 2013. “Rational illogicality”
Syracuse, colloquium, November 2013. “Semantic bookkeeping and semantic teleology”.
Leeds Centre for metaphysics and mind, November 2014 “Semantic bookkeeping and semantic teleology”.
Oxford, philosophy of mathematics seminar, November 2013. “Rational illogicality”
Edinburgh, departmental colloquium, October 2013. “Semantic bookkeeping and semantic teleology”
St Andrews, departmental colloquium, October 2013. “Rational illogicality”
Aberdeen, research seminar, October 2013. “Mindmaking”
Sydney, July 2013. “Inconceivable Indeterminacy”
ANU, Thursday seminar, July 2013. “Mind-Making”
Brisbane AAP, July 2013. “Two kinds of logical norm”.
Nottingham, departmental colloquium, February 2013. “Intuitionism, indeterminacy and inconstancy”
Glasgow, departmental colloquium, January 2013. “Decision making under indeterminacy”
Aberdeen, workshop for Crispin Wright, December 2012. “Intuitionism, indeterminacy and inconstancy”.
Oxford, Jowett Society, November 2012. “Reference magnetism”.
Goodman:
2015 APA Pacific Division Conference. “Thoughts about specific non-existent objects: Crane’s Objects of Thoughts”
Centre for Metaphysics and Mind, Leeds “In what sense are mental files diachronic?”
UC Davis, “Singular thought as a cognitive kind”.
University of Nottingham departmental seminar “Cognitivism, mental files and singular thought”.
University of Illinois, Chicago, “Cognitivism, mental files and singular thought”.
University of Sheffield, “Reference, co-reference and singular thought”.
Symposium on the work of Francois Recanati, University of St Andrews, “Epistemically rewarding relations and mental files”.
Leeds philosophy department colloquium, March 2014, “Against the Mental Files Conception of Singular Thought.”
Philosophy of Language in the UK Conference (PLUK), March 2014, “On the Supposed Connection between Singular Thought and Proper Names.”
Reading philosophy department colloquium, November 2014, “Cognitivism, Significance and Singular Thought”
Edinburgh epistemology group, October 2014, “Cognitivism, Significance and Singular Thought.”
Carr:
Diachronic rationality workshop, Wisconsin, Madison, summer 2015. “Rationality over time”
Epistemic utility of imprecise credences, Bristol, 2015. “Chancy accuracy and imprecise credences”.
Centre for Metaphysics and Mind, Leeds, 2015. “Mental metasemantics and rationality”.
Epistemic consequentialism conference, Konstanz, summer 2015, “Accuracy or Coherence?”
Choice group, LSE, 2015, “Accuracy or Coherence?”
Eastern APA, Philadelphia, 2014. “Accuracy or Coherence?”
Epistemic consequentialism workshop, LSE, 2014, “Accuracy or Coherence?”
USC Formal Epistemology Workshop, June 2014, “Accuracy or Coherence?”
St Louis Annual Conference on Reasons and Rationality, May 2014, “Imprecise Evidence without Imprecise Credences,”
University of Hamburg, April 2014, “The ‘If P, Ought P’ Problem.”
University of Bristol, March 2014, “Accuracy or Coherence?”
Philosophy of Language in the UK Conference (PLUK), March 2014, “The ‘If P, Ought P’ Problem.”
St Andrews Normative Language Workshop, November 2013, “Subjective ‘Ought’.”
Hewitt:
Second European Workshop on Non-Categorical Thinking (Turin), September 2016, “Modal Plural Logic: A plea for moderation”.
Kings College London, October 2016, “Against Serious Ontology”.
Third French Workshop on the Philosophy of Mathematics (Marseilles), November 2016, “Linguistic Reinterpretation and Indefinite Extensibility”.
Centre for Metaphysics and Mind, University of Leeds, February 2017, “The Limits of Ontology”.
Reasoning Club Annual Conference (Turin), May 2017, “Frege’s theorem in plural logic”.
Leckie:
University of York departmental colloquium, November 2016, “Words by Convention”.
Centre for Metaphysics and Mind, University of Leeds, October 2016, “Words by Convention”.
Workshop on The nature and understanding of sense (Leeds), June 2016, “What is known; what is thought; what is said”.
Centre for Metaphysics and Mind, University of Leeds, “Words. Words. Words”
University of Leeds, department colloquium, Nov 2015 “Understanding logical expressions”
Elliott:
LSE departmental colloquium, 2016, ‘Measuring the Beliefs of the Frequently Irrational’
National Uni of Singapore, 2016, ‘Measuring the Beliefs of the Frequently Irrational’
Centre for Metaphysics and Mind, University Leeds, 2016, ‘Impossible Worlds and Partial Beliefs’
Gamester:
Pluralism Workshop 3, Cogito Research Centre, University of Bologna, Italy, 19-21 December, 2016, Workshop on his thesis, including a reading group on “Expressivism and Moral Truth: Or, Why the Expressivist Can Only Go So Far Wrong”, and presentations of “Truth: Explanation, Success, and Coincidence” and “Infinite Liars are Better than One”.
Truth: Deflationism and Beyond, University of Sassari, Italy, 23-24 September 2016, “Truth: Explanation, Success, and Coincidence”
Pluralisms Week at Yonsei University, South Korea, 11-20 June 2016 “OMG?! Truth Pluralism, Mixing Problems, and the One-Many Gambit”
5thAnnual Graduate Conference: Logic and Language (University of Calgary, Canada, May, 2016, “OMG?! Truth Pluralism, Mixing Problems, and the One-Many Gambit”
Language @ Leeds Seminar, University of Leeds, May 2015, “OMG?! Truth Pluralism, Mixing Problems, and the One-Many Gambit”
Centre for Metaphysics and Mind, University of Leeds, February 2017, “Infinite Liars are Better than One”
Language and Metalanguage, Logic and Meta-Logic; Revisiting Tarski’s Hierarchy at Universite Catholique de Louvain, Belgium, May 2016, “Infinite Liars are Better than One”
Centre for Ethics and Metaethics, University of Leeds, January 2017, “Expressivism and Moral Truth: Or, Why the Expressivist Can Only Go So Far Wrong”
British Postgraduate Philosophy Association Annual Conference, University of Leeds, September 2014, “Philosophical Analysis and Default Pluralism”
Crosilla:
“Trends in Proof Theory”, satellite meeting of the 2015 Jahrestagung der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung, Hamburg, (Germany), September 2015, “Predicativity: between Philosophy of Mathematics and Proof Theory,”
Tasker:
The Metaphysics of Words, Leeds University, June 2017, “The real problem with the form-theoretic view of words”.
Foundations of Thought 