People

Robert Williams. Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, University of Leeds.
AOS: Philosophy of logic and language, Metaphysics, Formal epistemology.
Role: Director of NatRep.

Daniel Elstein (Post-doctoral research fellow)
Sept 2015-

Simon Hewitt (Post-doctoral research fellow)
Sept 2016-
AOS: Logic, Philosophy of language, Philosophy of mathematics.

Gail Leckie. (Post-doctoral research fellow)
Sept 2015-
AOS: Philosophy of language, philosophy of mind

Thomas Brouwer (Post-Doctoral Research Fellow)

June 2016-

My research interests run from the philosophy of logic (the nature of truth and falsity, logical consequence, the normativity of logic) to metaphysics (metaontology, social ontology) and metasemantics (semantic indeterminacy, externalism). I obtained my PhD in 2013 at the University of Leeds, spent two years at the Northern Institute of Philosophy in Aberdeen, and returned to Leeds in 2015, joining NatRep in 2016.

Nick Tasker (project PhD student).
Sept. 2013 –

Will Gamester (project PhD student).
Sept. 2013 –

 

Past Members:

Jennifer Carr (postdoctoral research fellow in philosophy of language).
Sept. 2013- Sept 2015

Rachel Goodman (postdoctoral research fellow in philosophy of mind).
Sept 2013-Sept 2016
Rachel earned her PhD from the University of Chicago in 2013. Her dissertation was a defense of the idea that singular thought plays a special role with respect to thought more generally: it supplies thought’s content. Her current interests center on the relationship between mental files and singular thought, and the role of object-dependent content in a theory of thought. More broadly, she is interested in what grounds thought and makes it contentful, in the relationship between mental and linguistic content, and in questions about individual competence raised by being an externalist about mental content.

(Jan 2016 – Sep 2016)
I mainly work in formal philosophy of mind. The focus of my research is on the nature of mental representation, with a particular emphasis on degrees of belief and other ‘quantitative’ propositional attitudes.  I also have research interests in formal epistemology, decision theory, and the philosophy of language. My current work is on the de-idealisation of representation theorems for decision theory, the interpretation of imprecise credences, and the relationship between quantitative and qualitative degrees of belief.

Laura Crosilla (PhD student)
Mar-Nov 2015